Spoiler Alert: This spoils central plot points of John Wick, John Wick 2 and John Wick 3.
Should You See Those Movies: Yes. They’re awesome. Unless you do not like violence, especially gun violence, in which case they’re not for you.
John Wick exists in a special universe. Its criminal world has a unique economy and set of norms, laws and actions. Come for the stylized violence. Stay for the world building.
John Wick 2 presents one version of this universe. John Wick 3 takes place directly after, and engages directly with the events of John Wick 2, but presents an importantly different version of that universe. I want to explore that difference.
Beyond this point, the post will assume you’ve seen all three movies, and spoilers will be both massive and unmarked.
Original Post by Robin: Simple Rules
Previously: Simple Rules of Law
Sarah Constantin on Twitter (if you are doomed to be on social media at all, you should follow her) offers a commentary thread of alternate explanations for the pattern pointed out in Robin’s post. It contains some ideas that I didn’t cover and deserve to be addressed, so this post will do that, and capture her arguments in an easier-to-find-in-the-future location. Quotes are from the thread.
Response To: Who Likes Simple Rules?
Epistemic Status: Working through examples with varying degrees of confidence, to help us be concrete and eventually generalize.
Robin Hanson has, in his words, “some puzzles” that I will be analyzing. I’ve added letters for reference.
Epistemic Status: Concrete data on how something works with curiosity as to the gears behind the decisions, and a desire to record exactly what happened for posterity so we have detailed accurate records and perhaps an example of some things. But no reason to think any of it is important, or you should feel any great need to read it.
“You don’t know what you have until you go to New Jersey” – My wife Laura, when this was almost over.
This happened on Saturday night, as I attempted to transport myself, my wife and our two children home from their in-laws.
Epistemic Status: Overheard in New York
I am walking and talking with my friend, a Type I Diabetic, when he receives a phone call from his doctor’s office.
As a Type I Diabetic, my friend needs insulin. The effects of not having insulin are very bad, and include death.
He has run out of refills on his prescription, and will run out of insulin on Saturday. He called about a week ago to attempt to remedy this situation and get refills.
That’s for background. This isn’t about the order of magnitude higher my friend’s copay is in America, compared to the entire retail price in Canada.
This is about my friend’s attempt to get legal permission to continue buying life-saving medication for a lifelong condition with no known cure.
Related to: Asymmetric Justice, Privacy, Blackmail
Previously (Paul Christiano): Epistemic Incentives and Sluggish Updating
The starting context here is the problem of what Paul calls sluggish updating. Bob is asked to predict the probability of a recession this summer. He said 75% in January, and how believes 50% in February. What to do? Paul sees Bob as thinking roughly this:
If I stick to my guns with 75%, then I still have a 50-50 chance of looking smarter than Alice when a recession occurs. If I waffle and say 50%, then I won’t get any credit even if my initial prediction was good. Of course if I stick with 75% now and only go down to 50% later then I’ll get dinged for making a bad prediction right now—but that’s little worse than what people will think of me immediately if I waffle.
Paul concludes that this is likely:
Bob’s optimal strategy depends on exactly how people are evaluating him. If they care exclusively about evaluating his performance in January then he should always stick with his original guess of 75%. If they care exclusively about evaluating his performance in February then he should go straight to 50%. In the more realistic case where they care about both, his optimal strategy is somewhere in between. He might update to 70% this week.
This results in a pattern of “sluggish” updating in a predictable direction: once I see Bob adjust his probability from 75% down to 70%, I expect that his “real” estimate is lower still. In expectation, his probability is going to keep going down in subsequent months. (Though it’s not a sure thing—the whole point of Bob’s behavior is to hold out hope that his original estimate will turn out to be reasonable and he can save face.)
This isn’t ‘sluggish’ updating, of the type we talk about when we discuss the Aumann Agreement Theorem and its claim that rational parties can’t agree to disagree. It’s dishonest update reporting. As Paul says, explicitly.
Related and required reading in life (ANOIEAEIB): The Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics
Epistemic Status: Trying to be minimally judgmental
Spoiler Alert: Contains minor mostly harmless spoiler for The Good Place, which is the best show currently on television.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics (in parallel with the similarly named one in physics) is as follows:
The Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics says that when you observe or interact with a problem in any way, you can be blamed for it. At the very least, you are to blame for not doing more. Even if you don’t make the problem worse, even if you make it slightly better, the ethical burden of the problem falls on you as soon as you observe it. In particular, if you interact with a problem and benefit from it, you are a complete monster. I don’t subscribe to this school of thought, but it seems pretty popular.
I don’t say this often, but seriously, read the whole thing.
I do not subscribe to this interpretation.
I believe that the majority of people effectively endorse this interpretation. I do not think they endorse it consciously or explicitly. But they act as if it is true.
Another aspect of this same phenomenon is how most people view justice.