I was mostly happy with the Covid-style approach I tried out last time. This is an update of ‘all the things worth noting since then’ but excluding prediction markets. I plan to do a prediction market update next, and keep those two tracks distinct. I do talk a bit about how I would characterize various final settlements, with an aim of getting prediction markets that can better reflect the nature of the final outcome.
Note that there is also an essentially endless list of claims of Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity, and I’m almost entirely not including them. You do not need me to tell you about this aspect of what is going on.
Lots of detail keeps coming in, and there are many incremental changes and updates, but the central facts seem similar to how they seemed as of my last post, so I won’t be re-summarizing them. Things are no longer moving quite so fast.
Potential Donations
From Bloomberg on March 15, an economist talks about fighting for Ukraine.
Here is the money quote, file under Huge If True (but I can’t evaluate it).
We don’t need food or paper towels. What the army needs is munitions and people need medical supplies, specific medical supplies. Most people die from blood loss after a cluster bomb or after some kind of ballistic missile falls. There may be 20 or 200 people wounded. It’s a little bit like when an airplane cabin loses pressure, the masks fall down — and what you need to do is to put the mask on yourself and then help others. So in this case, the mask analogy is a medical kit, which allows you to stop bleeding. So you really have to ensure that you are not bleeding, and then that people next to you are not bleeding.
So you have to have a lot of these medical kits, and they usually cost 10 or 20 bucks. But now of course they cost 100 bucks because it’s surge pricing and no one can deliver. So we are trying to focus on this specifically. Civilian authorities need them and even railroads are asking for these medical kits because evacuation trains get shelled and people die without this specific kit. We will deliver them. We have connections, there’ll be no [extra overhead charges]. It doesn’t get stolen on the way. And [your donation] is also tax deductible in the U.S. So for $100, you’ll save a life and get your taxes back.
There is a catch. It’s not so easy to actually get things where they need be.
And you need to get suppliers. In war, there are so many intermediaries and fees. So you have to establish a procurement department to figure out who is serious. Once you have suppliers, you have to figure out all the [wartime] export licenses, all these government regulations. And of course things get stolen on the way. For example, one large, well-known American charity sends 95 pallets of medical supplies to Ukraine. When it arrives, it’s only two pallets because 93 of them got stolen somewhere. Not in Ukraine — either in Poland or even in New Jersey. So you have to watch for this. You actually have to put your own people in Warsaw or in New Jersey, in Israel, in Sweden, to check what has been loaded at every point so that it doesn’t get stolen. It’s a logistical nightmare. And when you finally get it to Ukraine, people are shooting at you at checkpoints.
…
One specific thing: We need 307,000 medical kits. I have the specification. Let’s say Israel can only supply 30,000 and Canada probably can supply 20 or 30,000. But we have suppliers who can provide the medical kits. We give this specification to [Ukraine’s] Ministry of Health, and our charitable foundation will pay. So tag me or email me or ping me on Twitter — and then donate, please donate.
All the fundraising goes directly to logistics. I have a website at the university of the charitable foundation [Kyiv School of Economics Humanitarian Relief Fund], and there is a Twitter post at my account. If I get a hundred dollars on that charitable foundation, it goes towards medical kits and it’s likely going to save a life.
These claims seem at least plausible. If they are, then you don’t save a life for $100 on average because obviously each kit saves a lot less than one life, but this seems likely to be competitive with other life-saving causes on purely humanitarian grounds. Any impact on events beyond that would then be a bonus. So I’m very curious.
War Aims
Speculation from March 20 on Russian war aims. Model here is that Russia planned ‘spontaneous’ ‘People’s Republics’ across much of Eastern Ukraine, which it then could absorb in time. With military setbacks, the model says this plan has scaled down but is still mostly present. Mariupol is then the defiant city that wouldn’t give in, and must be punished for symbolic reasons, more than it has military value. Many others however disagree and think that the military value of Mariupol remains high.
Military Progress and Conditions
Mariupol does also seem to be falling, if slowly, into Russian control. Here is a Russian-aligned source discussing their view of the failed ultimatum where Russia demanded the city surrender. The line taken is that the demand because Russia still views this as a ‘special operation’ with similar people so surrender should be no big deal, but of course Ukrainians do not see it this way. Which is an interesting way to present ‘we threatened death and destruction to get them to give up, and they said no.’
Article in The Atlantic where a marine fighting for Ukraine details what it has been like. Describes Russian army as completely command controlled whereas Ukrainian soldiers can take initiative and can run circles around them, and also a new situation where armored vehicles are potential sitting ducks, which is all verified by other sources.
Thread from 19 March estimating casualties. Early numbers for Russia are on extreme high end since they are Ukrainian claims, Ukrainian numbers likely low. Russian source later gives 9,861 killed and 16,153 injured on 21 March.

In general, Ukraine does seem like (based on tallied visually confirmed equipment losses) to be a bad place to be a Russian ‘unknown truck.’
NATO estimates Russian deaths at 7k-15k (thread is another general assessment), in line with the above. That’s only deaths, and generally several times that many are injured or desert, and thus unable to continue.
Ukraine claims Russian forces have ‘only three days of ammunition and food.’ No idea either if this is accurate, or if it is normal, but gives an idea of how fast it could be an issue if troops were cut off from supply.
March 24 Twitter thread assessment of state of play, saying both sides forces are increasingly exhausted, sanctions have disappointed and will need to be ramped up especially with respect to oil and gas, and an expectation that territorial ‘facts on the ground’ will play a key role in final settlement, which I’ll discuss in its own section.
March 24: Russia claims to have captured Izyum near Kharkiv, which Ukraine denies. Then Ukraine claims to have recaptured Lukyanovka nine miles east of Kyiv which is crucial to local supply lines, potentially encircling some troops although other reports doubt this, and some other areas further east of Kyiv, with the distance of Russian forces from the city increasing. The rate of reports of successful Ukrainian counter-attacks seems to be increasing. Ukraine also claims progress in other areas, while Russia makes clear progress in Mariupol.
From AFP, a map of the area around Kyiv:

The amount of yellow here makes this look like more progress than it is, but this does seem like a net better position than a week ago, and if remotely accurate then Kyiv is in no danger of encirclement.
Another thread from 24 March assessing the broad state of play, with Russia not making progress and transitioning to defensive positions except in Donbas, and Ukraine going on the offensive near Kyiv. Lots of great low-level details here.
If Ukraine can relieve the pressure on Kyiv, that would potentially free up quite a lot of troops for other operations that are currently defending Kyiv. If anything Kyiv already feels far too well-defended, despite its importance. If a bunch of those defenders can travel that would be big.
Russian soldiers potentially experiencing widespread frostbite.

I do hear Russia is cold and equipment provided was poor. It does seem strange that Russia does not prepare properly for Russian winter, you’d think that would very much fall under #YouHadOneJob. In a non-functioning system that is one too many.
Assessment that a war of attrition is coming. Getting to this stage is a win for Ukraine, but who is favored if Russian positions do not collapse and supply is maintained, settling in for a long war? That depends on which side can put in more effective resources. It is not clear to me that Russia can bring that much capacity to bear, but in theory it could. Some commenters expressed skepticism that West will be willing to provide material support in large amounts indefinitely, but that seems like exactly the kind of thing we would do once we work out how to do it.
An analysis of how map displays have changed throughout the war, to downplay Russia’s progress and offensives, and to showcase Ukrainian forces.
We started with this.

Now with mostly the same situation, we have this.

One can take a cynical propaganda view here, or a view that the new maps are more reflective of the realities on the ground. Or both. I am inclined to say both, but with a clear move from a bias in one direction to the same bias in the other direction.
Here is a thread with some more telling maps from 24 March.

Forward movement of Russian troops and areas of firm control:

Or the forward line:

The roads taken:

And finally, around Kyiv.

In Putin’s Russia
Technically Russians have the right to peacefully protest. In practice of course they do not. That leads to scenes like this.

When I see a photo like this, my instinctual interpretation is that this is a collaboration between Olga and the troops behind her to generate the photo opportunity. Normally when a photo is staged it makes it less powerful. Here I wonder if the reverse is true. If the troops are intentionally helping to create powerful photos of protest then one could say that is the troops joining the protest. Which makes this interesting.
There have also been reports of the classic Russian joke come to life where people are arrested for holding up blank signs and leaflets (“What is there to say? It’s obvious!”) or arrested for signs with asterisks (“***** ***”) as denigrating the troops.
As noted in the detailed operational thread from the previous section, Russia is increasingly framing this war internally as existential. Which is an odd thing to do while continuing to deny it is a war, forcing a kind of doublethink. It also has to be considered in light of Russian nuclear policy, which was affirmed as only to be used when the existence of the state is threatened. So then it becomes vital to represent that you see a threat to the existence of the state.
Russia also claiming that Hunter Biden personally financed the Pentagon’s Ukrainian biological weapons labs. Bingo, sir. Why not throw it all together? Once your claim is obviously false, why stop? Better to max out benefits of asserting the obviously false.
Russia’s only tank producer halts production over lack of supplies.
Russian stock market reopens and rallies, foreigners can’t sell and government is buying. If you are private Russian citizen, I would try not to be long this time next week. It was down the next day.
Russian economic prognosis looks grim. The claims that Russia can ‘pivot to China’ in various forms seem like they are better than total failure but do not seem like they offer much hope of a rebound. Also points out that Ukraine’s economy has been a dismal failure for 30 years and this is likely due to those with power in Ukraine having had an anti-growth agenda. Ukraine can be successful after the war assuming it survives, but it needs to turn that around even more than it needs help.
Biden wants to expel Russia from the G20, despite no obvious procedural way to do that. Russia says that exclusion from the G20 ‘would not be “fatal”.’ Which seems like one of those denials that raises a lot of questions it proports to answer, and makes me think it would be more effective than I would have otherwise expected.
Russian troops refuse to go to Ukraine on grounds they do not have passports, so Russia fires them. Not only are they not going to Ukraine and not under arrest, they are suing claiming they were fired illegally. I bet there are quite a few others who would if they found out about this be kicking themselves for not ‘getting themselves fired.’
Nestle continues to provide nutritional services in Russia, with profits going to humanitarian relief, suspends its anti-nutritional brands from operating. Response seems to be to treat this as insufficient and to vilify Nestle.
Russia faces shortages of medical supplies, including insulin. Officials blame ‘panic buying.’
Finland closes its passenger rail connection to Russia. This seems like a pure unforced error, as the train could be used to allow Russians to flee and now it is gone.
According to a Russian news article, 70,000 IT personnel have left and another 100,000 will follow. Google estimates this is out of an IT work force of 1.3 million, so substantial but not obviously a crisis level problem yet.
Oil and Gas
There is a ‘grace period’ for Russian oil? Soon to be a major motion picture: A tanker just left port and has until April 22 to deliver.
I do understand and sympathize with the basic problem Europe is facing. Did they do it to themselves as a completely unforced error by relying on Russian oil and gas for no reason? Well, all right, yes, they did that.
Did the dynamics involved greatly contribute to Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, thus making them even more responsible for their own mess? Well, all right, that too.
So I understand the hesitation, and find it pleasantly surprising that they seemed increasingly ready to perhaps pull the trigger anyway, even if it was far from clear they would do so. Then Russia decided to give them a little push, and demanded that payments be made in Rubles, claiming Euros and Dollars were ‘compromised’ currencies.
My first thought on that was definitely to reply ‘oh, all right, of course that will be at the official exchange rate’ and then put a huge grin on one’s face, but another alternative is to use this shift from ‘it flows automatically unless you come together and cut it off’ to ‘it stops flowing unless you come together and actively stop it from being cut off’ to grow a spine and/or do Europe’s favorite activity of ‘nothing’ very well, and let nature heal.
Poland actively said no, then the Dutch and it seems now all of Europe. Which puts Putin in a highly awkward position. Either he caves on the payments, or he shuts off the gas.
It is still a tricky problem, when you are ideologically devoted to not using nuclear power (thanks in part due to Russian propaganda) and are incapable of pretty much ever doing anything so they can’t even do things like a campaign to mass-manufacture heat pumps.
American and Europe have reached an agreement on LNG, which should help somewhat. Germany claims it is making ‘drastic slashes.’ There are many signs the European public is willing to do a lot more a lot faster, but officials some combination of don’t know how and don’t believe the public. They don’t know how to do much of anything quickly pretty much ever, the physical problem is hard, the solutions cost money and they’ve tied their hands on budgets, and when they don’t ‘believe the public’ I agree with them. As in, they say they would be willing to endure the cold and have real shortages and high prices, but is that how they would vote? Historical analysis suggests this is unlikely.
For America I feel no such sympathy.
America has a problem. Gas and oil prices are high.
Given that America produces as much oil and gas as it consumes this does not seem to me like it is a problem.
Yes, it is a distributional problem, in the sense that it transfers wealth from those who consume to those who produce. But there’s an easy fix for that. You can impose a tax on oil and gas profits, and return that money to consumers as a rebate. Or you can tax the gasoline and return the money as a rebate, since tax incidence will be some mix of consumer and producer, and because raising the price of gas will lower consumption, which is half of how one fills the gap on the world market from the missing Russian oil.
We could also do things like restart the keystone pipeline. The counterargument there is that this would take years to actually transport anything, so what’s the point? The argument at the link is that reopening the pipeline (1) signals a future price decrease due to increased supply which (2) leads to more deployment of reserves now which (3) lowers the price now.
I don’t fully understand the economic argument here, because it only functions if future prices are anticipated to be higher than current prices. I checked the market data and that’s very much not true. Who would want to hold onto physical oil right now as a private investor? Sure, you might buy oil futures, but that’s strictly better. If you have oil now, you already sell it.
On the contrary, last time I suggested the government buy long-dated oil futures and sell oil from the strategic reserve to compensate. Does anyone have a reason why this wouldn’t (1) be profitable and (2) work to lower current prices and (3) work to increase production?
Then again maybe it wouldn’t increase production? Bloomberg surveyed oil producers for why they were failing at their #YouHadOneJob of producing more oil when the price went up, and a lot of them said they would not collectively go into growth mode increase production at any price.

Of those who had a price, the price was mostly remarkably cheap.
This is deeply weird. If price goes up and you can produce at some price, you… produce more? Maybe you sell futures to hedge?
The oil price is not the constraint. The primary constraint is capital, and then other factors like politics, ESG considerations, regulations, and supply chain issues are secondary.
Damn you, ESG and political considerations and regulations that are doing the opposite of what they are supposed to be doing right now. Damn you!
But more than that, shareholders and the market are kind of insane?
Overwhelmingly, its investor demands for capital discipline holding back new drilling.
…
After a decade of huge losses, as a result of aggressive capital expenditure, shareholders are prioritizing cash flow above all else. And the executive teams at these energy companies are getting the message.
If shareholders stand ready to punish those who can buy something low and sell it high, then A Fool and His Money need to soon be parted via changes in ownership. Can we call in some private equity? And further discard the EMH?
Purchase guarantees also seem fine, especially if they run both ways and government has right of first refusal at the fixed price. Something that blew my mind when I first saw the numbers was simply that Russian oil and gas is not that much oil and gas in the context of the global market. It’s a few percent. We don’t have to work that hard to make up for it, modulo the need to work on transportation issues.
Or, when you see something where there is a shortage due to excess demand and not enough supply, with supply short-term inelastic, and producers are using profits to fight a war, you could… subsidize demand?


This is actually much less dumb than it sounds. Given the size involved this is basically writing checks to vehicle owners, and then the money is fungible. It’s not like any of these cards won’t get used. So this should primarily be an income effect. The gas is not free on the margin unless you consume less than $800 worth of gas, which would mean you rarely if ever drive much, and (2) can’t sell or otherwise transfer the gas to someone who does. So my guess is the prices at the pump should move almost not at all, and this is fine? It’s an increase in the progressiveness of the California tax code, and a transfer from any walkable areas in California (?) to non-walkable ones.
Reminder that American gas prices even when super high are super low.

We really are a bunch of whining babies about this one. And our politicians do not control the government, for example after much struggle the Post Office under Biden is now going to buy 20% of its new vehicles as electric vehicles – and 80% non-electric, but also complete inability to manage regulations to actually build or accomplish anything pretty much ever. I know, yes, ‘politics’ and all that, but seriously what the hell. And yes, I know ‘built lives around the expectations of’ but if you want those expectations to change how do you intend to do that?
Ideal would be to tax the thing you want to see people use less, so naturally instead everyone is falling over themselves to cut the gas tax. Which even Germany is doing, likely along with a number of American states. If Germany wanted to not have energy and hurt the climate, would its actions be different?
Manchin, whose permission is necessary to ever do anything these days since no Republican is willing to vote for any meaningful spending, seems to be actively pushing for an ‘all-of-the-above’ style energy bill. His offer seems to be, you give me more oil and gas, and I’ll give you more for other energy sources, and also some other spending and taxes you want as a bonus. It isn’t in this article but I’ve even seen that he’s in favor of ‘advanced nuclear power.’ So he’s essentially screaming to make a deal where we do a bunch of stuff we should be doing, and in exchange he’ll sign off on other stuff, and somehow this still is not getting done.
EU Style
The part I do understand: The European Union works by unanimous consent. If they want to do anything that is not already on autopilot, even a single veto seems to be sufficient to stop them. In particular, Hungary decided to veto a bad on Russian gas, or any sort of peacekeeping mission or no-fly zone, so unless they change their minds that it that.
The part I do not understand: Why everyone else can’t agree to do it anyway.
If a group decides something unanimously, and has the power to do it, they can do it. That would take them outside the formal channels of the EU (or in another context of NATO) but I do not see any barrier to an agreement to stop importing Russian gas followed by everyone who agreed to it no longer importing Russian gas. Hungary would keep importing, but that does not seem like that big a problem.
China Style
Article looking at Chinese relationship with Russia in light of the war. A lot of the overall picture seems clear. We know China knew Russia was going to attack, but that what it did not expect was for Russia to botch the operation, and likely it also did not expect a full invasion. But Xi is personally ensuring that China backs up Russia at least somewhat. The war is directly hurting China’s interests in the sense that it is driving up the prices of many things China buys, and forcing China to support Russia rather than other way around. Perhaps China still turns a profit by buying up Russia on the cheap, but the risk of disruptions in its much bigger trades with the West seem large.
I do not expect China to provide the kinds of aid that would endanger China’s trading relationships, so they would have to stick with things that would not provoke such a reaction. That could still be a substantial impact, and also they could end up being wrong about what provokes a reaction, or the threshold could change steadily over time. Rather than the expectation by some that Western willingness to pay costs will decline over time, I expect to see the opposite by default if Russia presses forward.
I understand there is a widespread Chinese argument that is essentially (don’t have the link) ‘why should we help you fight our friend now so you can concentrate on us next?’ Or otherwise to view the broader situation as an inevitable USA-China conflict, and thus China needs to support Russia.
This raises the central question about China. To what extent is Xi’s and/or the Party’s and/or China’s view that the world is essentially zero sum? I don’t know.
Trump Style
A former president said some words. Now hear him out.


Now I do concede that one would not call any of that ‘literate’ or deny that it constitutes ‘word salad’ and we should all slow down to appreciate the nonsensicalness but also the poetry and evocation involved.
One could even call the lack of proper word usage a feature. The goal is to string together snippets that point in the direction of potential associations and actions, that paint a picture regardless of its lack of logical cohesion. If part of this game is not telling them what you wouldn’t do and keeping them guessing, that’s the idea, while still letting others calibrate on intent.
The basic idea is clear. Do not use the air force, that would cause an incident. But one can use gunboat diplomacy with the navy (‘coasting up and down your coast’ is a great line, don’t try to deny it) and with other forms of aid. General incremental escalation, with a side of ‘I have no idea what I am talking about so who knows what I might do.’
And yes, Ukraine is indeed doing ‘an amazing job’ even if you think they are in long term trouble.
Peace Talks and Victory Conditions
There has been a lot of discussion in the comments and elsewhere about who will ‘win’ the war. It would be good to have prediction markets on this directly, but we mostly don’t because of definitional issues. What does it mean to win? Could we make a prediction market for this that would work?
Suppose you were playing an Avalon Hill board game called Putin’s War. What would be the victory conditions for each side, as measured by the state of play after the war?
What would be a minor, major or total victory for each side?
Last time, I summarized the discussions over peace talks as breaking down into three areas, and I would add a fourth to cover sanctions, as it does not seem fully obvious that they will be fully lifted after this ends.
- Territorial concessions.
- Demilitarization and Non-Alignment.
- ‘Denazification.’
- Sanctions and potentially reparations.
Denazification seems to have mostly been dropped as a meaningful demand. Sanctions are becoming an increasing issue now that America has identified Russia as committing war crimes, among other pressures to not lift the sanctions after the war. I still expect us to be willing to mostly normalize things conditional on a Russian withdrawal that follows a negotiated settlement, but I am less confident of this than I was a week ago. Reparations still seem highly unlikely to me.
This is another way of breaking it down, and an update on negotiations.

Denazification has become ‘Russian language’ here, which means it’s nominal. As far as I can tell, the one imposing language rules is Russia, already imposing Russian-only schooling in territories it occupies. Reports I’ve seen are that Ukraine does the bilingual thing fine, and also they’re mutually interpretable so not such a big deal.
There’s nothing here about the EU, only NATO, so that seems to be done with. Partial disarmament I have to assume mostly represents not hosting foreign assets, but perhaps not, in which case I’m not sure why Ukraine is onboard. Collective security means ‘Ukraine wants people to promise to protect it’ and I still don’t know why Ukraine thinks this is worth asking about.
That leaves Crimea and Donbas, but that implies that Putin isn’t yet making any claims on the rest of Ukrainian territory, even the parts that are occupied now.
This two minute interview claims that Russian negotiators largely do understand the situation they are in, and are taking the talks seriously, but that more pressure still needs to be applied via sanctions and weapon shipments to raise the cost of war and force a settlement, and that the agreement is still likely months away.
I suggest the following definitions.
Conceptually:
Total Russian Victory: Ukraine is a client or rump state and Russia ‘gets away with it.’
Major Russian Victory: Ukraine is a client or rump state, but at what cost?
Minor Russian Victory: Ukraine survives, Russia gets substantial concessions.
Minor Ukrainian Victory: Ukraine survives, Russia gets claim to symbolic victory.
Major Ukrainian Victory: Ukraine survives, no plausible Russian symbolic victory.
Total Ukrainian Victory: Ukraine restores its borders to those of 1994.
Note of course that Ukraine will be much worse off than if there had been no war even if they win completely, and Russia will be much worse off even if they win completely. It’s not that no one ever wins a war in that sense, but it is rare.
Here are my suggested details:
Total Russian Victory: Russia wins a Major Victory, and within one year after the West lifts sanctions on the Russian Central Bank and there is no major insurgency.
Major Russian Victory: One of the following must occur.
- Russia sets up puppet states that include, or annexes, Kyiv.
- Russia sets up a compliant Ukrainian pro-Russian government.
- Ukraine is demilitarized such that it cannot in future defend itself.
Kyiv is a proxy here for a sufficiently important amount of Ukrainian territory.
I would consider (for example) the Russian-proposed 50,000 troop limit on Ukraine to count, let’s say anything under 200k or any major limits on conventional weaponry.
Minor Russian Victory: The following conditions must be fulfilled.
- Russia does not win a major victory.
- DNR/LNR are de facto independent and Crimea remains Russian.
- Ukraine agrees never to join NATO or host foreign troops or bases.
- AT LEAST ONE: Ukraine agrees to not join EU and EU Economic Community OR Ukraine loses substantial additional territory larger in total size than Donetsk in addition to losses in Donetsk.
- ALTERNATIVELY: Additional major concessions not listed here that are sufficiently large to make up for whatever above conditions are not fulfilled.
Seems impossible to make this match our intuitions without a ‘something else’ clause. I do realize such a clause is not ideal.
Minor Ukrainian Victory: The following conditions must be fulfilled.
- Russia does not win even a minor victory.
- DNR/LNR and Crimea remain de facto Russian.
- Ukraine agrees never to join NATO.
If the decisions on territories is put to a vote of any kind, the outcome is based on what happens after the vote. Presumably Crimea would go to Russia, Donbas unclear.
Major Ukrainian Victory: Russia fails to achieve the above conditions.
Total Ukrainian Victory: Russia achieves NONE of the above conditions, including the return of Ukraine’s 1994 borders.
With those definitions, I would feel good about at least setting up Manifold Markets versions to see what happens, but want to get feedback first. These definitions are not tight enough for Metaculus let alone Polymarket, although there are portions of this that could be asked.
I worry a bit about anchoring effects, but I expect a Minor Ukrainian Victory (40%?) with the second most likely outcome a Minor Russian Victory (25%?), then Major Ukrainian Victory (10%) and about 5% for each of the other three.
Essentially, while current negotiations may not be ‘fully real,’ it seems like Putin badly needs a plausible symbolic victory and Ukraine is willing to give one, and Russia’s military situation and demands make it seem very unlikely they can threaten Ukraine’s existence as a state even if things go relatively well.
This thread proposes a Ukrainian minor victory, plus some amount of reparations (good luck with that), but with the fate of Crimea and Donbass to fall to plebiscites. This is pitched as an ‘off ramp’ for Putin, and seems to me like a maximally hostile one.
A central question is, how much do current territorial gains matter?
One school of thought is that Putin will consider himself entitled to keep any gains won on the battlefield, or at least any that it would make sense to keep. Whereas Ukraine most definitely can’t agree to that any time soon. It also is highly contrary to the kind of history that Putin used to justify his invasion. You very much do not get to keep whatever you happen to occupy when there is a formal peace settlement, that has never been how this works. For a guy who lectures us for hours about events from Europa Universalis this would be a very poor understanding of war score and formal borders.
Thus, the big danger seems to come down to Russia being unwilling to give up its territorial gains, and Ukraine being unwilling to accept territorial losses, certainly anything beyond Crimea and Donbass – both sides demanding a minor victory until someone wins is about to win a major one.
This post on Putin’s situation suggests that this is right, because he botched expectations setting so badly that he cannot accept the kinds of concessions Ukraine could plausibly be willing to concede without risking the whole regime. He may have made it impossible for himself to save face, although the post seems not to contemplate at all that Ukraine might give up Donbass.
The other way those middling outcomes don’t happen is if the side that is losing does not realize they are losing until there is a sudden collapse, or they have internal reasons they can’t reach a negotiated settlement. Zelenskyy has his hands seriously tied especially in terms of giving up territory, and Putin might be some combination of delusional and not in a personally safe position to deal. Or if Putin gets overthrown then Russia’s position presumably collapses.
My plan is for my next Ukraine post to be a prediction market update, so I’ll think more carefully about probabilities then.
In Other News
Food supply crisis from the war is potentially a huge deal. We could see widespread hunger and resulting unrest due to lack of wheat, and we are doing very little about this despite having excellent timing with which to do something about it.
Reminder, in a war, do not take selfies. They get you killed.
Samo Burja is asked what has changed in the last two weeks.

I find this an interesting way to acknowledge lack of progress without claiming that the failure lies in Russia’s ability to execute. Again, it’s good to have a smart ‘what would we say if we somehow knew Russia was competent’ perspective.
I continue to not understand the perspective taken by Kasparov here, and expressed by Zelenskyy, that Article 5 is a dead letter and failure to fully go to war for Ukraine (for whom Article 5 did not apply) means that we wouldn’t go to war for the Baltic countries. My estimate of how likely we are to honor Article 5 is much higher than it was earlier. The danger would be if Putin and others of the mafioso nature can’t draw a distinction between ‘honors commitments and their words have meaning’ and ‘escalates regardless of prior commitments when they don’t like what is happening.’
It is certainly a viable idea that one might model everyone the second way or that Putin might do so, but the idea that it is accurate? Of course, the way you get World War 3 in full is if Putin thinks this way and is wrong.
I’d also note that by advocating for this perspective, Kasparov might perhaps be (very slightly) increasing the chance that Putin does end up thinking this way. Not that I think this means he shouldn’t say it if he believes it, but if one asks ‘who is going to adjust what they do based on this?’ that would be my answer.
Timeline of sanctions. Retweet claims various countries are ‘working around’ sanctions whereas the thread instead says that those countries are saying they will not sanction Russia. Which one is more relevant depends on whether this is a ‘if you’re not with us, you’re against us’ situation. Is it ‘working around’ X’s sanctions of Y if Z (who is not in X’s jurisdiction) trades with Y?
Chinese demands that the United States ‘disclose its biological military activities’ seem like pure anti-American signaling, an intentionally non-sensical demand to make it clear to those listening which side they are taking. That could be and likely is a prelude to more anti-American action, or it could be a way to buy room to engage in less while looking like they did their part.
Russia appears to be moving thousands of Ukrainians by force into Russia. Then giving them ‘job offers’ in remote areas, there are various names for this.
Yes, the Russians likely still kill deserters and those who refuse to fight, and have the Chechens do it.
First known defector to turn over a tank gets $10k cold hard cash. Seems low to me. Also gets opportunity to apply for citizenship.
Having read Tooze’s history of WWI during covid [to cheer me up, as WWI was so much worse], I can’t stop thinking about war reparations. Where does the $3 trillion (+/-???) to rebuild Ukraine come from? Can Russia be made to pay? Its GDP was only $1.4 Trillion in 2021. It is only 3.5X the population of Ukraine.
I mean, no, if that’s the bill then you can’t make Russia pay that much of it. They have nukes. I do not think the bill will be that high.
Maybe construction costs in Ukraine are 40% of the US….? In 2018 $/m^2 costs in Ukraine were reported as 48% of German costs. One author cites the recent storm damage to Puerto Rico at $140B (a budget request mind you…), with 8% of the population of Ukraine https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-ukraine-after-war. NOAA estimates damage from weather events in the US between 1980 and 2020 at $1.875 trillion. “the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated the cost of damages to be approximately $170 billion for Katrina, $74 billion for Sandy, $131 billion for Harvey, and $52 billion for Irma. These estimates include the value of damages to residential, commercial, and government or municipal buildings; material assets within the buildings; business interruption; vehicles and boats; offshore energy platforms; public infrastructure; and agricultural assets.”(https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-633r) Weather doesn’t often damage the structural frames of steel and concrete commercial and apartment buildings. Bombing them certainly does. Yes, Russia has nukes. But what if they face trade restrictions like Iran for 5 years? Nukes don’t buy jobs.
If you try to tell Russia to pay 200% of its GDP then there is a epsilon% chance they would choose to pay rather than accept any sanctions you throw at them, no matter how credible and universal. If Putin accepts he’s dead in 24 hours.
Regarding the Russian troops getting fired, here’s a source in Russian: https://www.the-village.ru/shorts/12-boytsov-omona. It mentions that those who refused were members of OMON, which is the equivalent of a SWAT team in America. In other words, these were policemen rather than soldiers and thus not subject to the same rules as the military. A Russian soldier would not be allowed to pull off a trick like that.
Yeah, that makes more sense. It tells you that they’re sending SWAT people into Ukraine, which is also interesting.
In the first week of the war they’ve also sent in SOBR service members, resulting in 4 lieutenant colonels dying: https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/509894-za-odin-den-pohoronili-vse-rukovodstvo-vladimirskogo-sobr-zhurnalist-o-masshtabah-poter-rf. The article notes that its extremely rare for a SOBR officer of that rank to die in battle. SOBR is another organization with responsibilities similar to OMON/SWAT.
It *sounds* like Putin initially thought that the war would go down as it did in Crimea, with regular troops refusing to defend their country and SWAT teams being necessary to capture/kill Zelensky and other high-ranking officials in Kiev, thus the need for SWAT teams. Otherwise I can’t explain why they would send the SWAT into Ukraine instead of regular infantry.
The biggest problem in cities behind Russian advance is actually lawlessness and looting (by locals) in particular, so yeah, there are attempts to bring some sort of order by sending police forces (most of Ukrainian police left, for obvious reasons).
Ivan Fedorov should have mentioned that; also city-specific Telegram channels have plenty of chatter on this topic…
“On the contrary, last time I suggested the government buy long-dated oil futures and sell oil from the strategic reserve to compensate. Does anyone have a reason why this wouldn’t (1) be profitable and (2) work to lower current prices and (3) work to increase production?”
I think the issue is 2 fold.
1st the layout of general oil production: Oil production is divided a bunch of ways, but one way is oil sand vs shale production. Oil sand production has relatively high up front costs, you have to drill a ton of wells and set up a distribution network and figure out the specific geology and what not. But, once you’ve done this it produces for years. This might take 5-8 years to get started and an oil sand field would peak after ~30 years and then keep on for an incredible long time. My family has mineral rights that have been producing between a few hundred to a few thousand dollars of year for 50+ years. That’s an oil sand field.
A shale field is another matter, it’s pretty cheap to drill, but basically produces instantly and requires constant expenditure, drilling and fracking to keep going. The setup is slightly faster, but the cost of production is much higher and it doesn’t have this long buildup and slow decline. So maybe you can start producing in 1-3 years (depending on available nearby infrastructure), but you’re constantly required to keep drilling new wells, adding distribution networks and signing new deals with landowners (not for mineral rights, but to have places to pump your used fracking liquids into the ground). Plus people hate living near it, micro-quakes, annoyance, tons of trucks, constant drilling. This isn’t the quaint pump in the back 40 going “tick” “tick” “tick” every few minutes. It’s mini-heavy industry spots, throughout the lifetime of the field.
Tar sands are sort of in between pure shale and an oil sand. It’s basically the cost and problems of shale, but longer production like oil sands (but huge refining costs).
This time frame assume pre-existing infrastructure exists. This is a problem, because if the 08 crash and flatlining of oil prices in the following time period (vs high prices before that) tar/shale production cratered and oil sand production was moderately curtailed. We are not setup to re-start pre-crash 08 tar/shale production. We have to ramp up, in situ refining , pipes, brains, new everything b/c it has been so unprofitable to go after for so long the companies have very little capacity to spin up here.
Oil sands have some variable production, but (this is where my understanding is stretched a bit) is that you can always drop production lower fairly easy, you can’t just increase production without risking damage to the field that would increase cost of future production. Slow and steady wins the race here.
Shale fields on the other hand, it’s just an expensive sprint between areas followed by some minimal oil sand production after you leave (depending on geology).
2nd the specific problems with the futures idea: The break even price of shale oil is controversial, but it’s somewhere between 60ish and 100ish per barrel (to quote someone I can’t recall “the difference between ore and dirt is the price to refine and get the minerals in the dirt to market”). A lot of this depends on where the oil is, how much refining is done in situ vs downstream and the regulatory cost of the area. Modern refineries are insanely expensive and huge, and building them in the middle of nowhere is frowned upon for environmental reasons, but also so is pipelines so a bit of an issue there. For example, a Exxon complex in Baytown, TX is ~ 5 square miles.
So if we offer futures contracts at (say) 50 a barrel, 75 a barrel and 100 a barrel we’ve got an issue. At 50, no one is even considering tar/shale production increases. They might produce some to meet those contracts as a backstop against cheap oil (ala coronavirus times), but probably not. At 75 a barrel some of the easier tar/shale production that was already in the pipeline might be brought on slightly earlier, but they would probably just ramp up their oil sand production and try and take the extra profit. As you note, specific regulations could be used to attempt to address that. At 100 a barrel (with a long enough timeframe) they would probably do some production, but it would take years to come online. This production would require building pipelines and/or refineries in places like N. Dakota, Canadian Shield, and other places painted as “pristine wildneress” when we’re talking about oil production (and, of course, derided as corn/soy/rapeseed fields of mono-culture deplorables during campaign season).
But, you’d have to offer massive amounts of staggered futures contracts to make it economically viable to do, at the same time I worry the answer still might be to just push the oil sands harder, let current plans for tar/shale come online and otherwise only marginally increase actual production (i.e. slowly slow down the oil sands to keep them in reserve for times of low cost oil and only run the tar/shale when people are willing to guarantee you 100/barrel.
I think this answers 2/3, but I’ll specific discuss 1 (profit). Tar/Shale production is so expensive, to convince people to get at it you’d have to offer unprofitable futures, knowing that you’ll be paying 100/barrel and when that oil production comes online it will almost certainly be lower. You might not even be able to regulate 100/barrel to be profitable, i.e. say “this future can only be fulfilled by new production from a field not online before 2022” depending on where it is coming from and the environmental issues, you might have to offer 125/150/175 in 2022 dollars to get it to worthwhile. And even then I wonder if the companies would believe it.
I don’t want to sound too off the wall here, but Michigan is actively trying to shank a crucial pipeline. We said no the Keystone XL, people are certainly going to actively resist future similar pipelines. You can’t economically handle this by sea from central Canada, and I don’t think you can get the in situ refining capacity (and distribution network) set up in less than a decade even if you overcome all enviro issues.
End notes:
1: There are different oil qualities and tar/shale is usually pretty crap to very crap. You’d be paying premium prices for meh goods.
2: Meaningful production increases might take 10-20 years to come online, that’s an eternity on a political spectrum and I don’t know if futures are the way to do that. I hate the idea of national oil companies, but that might be the way to go for some of these fields that will take 10 years to build out the infrastructure on. Read Daniel Yergen’s The Prize/The Quest for more (disclosure I took 1 or 2 classes from him back-in-the-day).
3: Daniel Yergen/Tim Worstall/Tim Newman would be the 3 people to reach out for more on this issue.
Thanks, that was all very clear and helpful. More comments like this from everyone, please.
We can see the current price curve here: https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/futures/CRUDE%20OIL%20-%20ELECTRONIC/contracts
If (1) is right, presumably all of this is saying that doing the trade until we’re no longer making a profit would still make us money and wouldn’t hurt or anything, but wouldn’t have that much impact on production because there’s very little available production that can be reasonably turned on?
I notice I am confused why we have this expectation that oil will be so affordable – these futures seem cheap to me under these conditions? Also a hedge against bad conditions, so good to buy on multiple fronts? What are we missing here? Perhaps the good leg is simply ‘buy oil futures’?
Fundamentally it sounds like you think the hurdles are (1) regulation and (2) the production will have a lot of lag and be distributed over many years and (3) promises aren’t credible.
Back of the envelope, we are talking about Russia taking a few million barrels a day offline, ~3 million. So if we bought those 3 million/day at $100/barrel from new production (let’s say) then the yearly cost of that is $109 billion, plus cost of building a new strategic oil reserve to store it, and in exchange we get the oil. Given how big a deal this seems to be for people, that seems… worth the risk? And also probably profitable in the sense that *at some point* you’ll be able to sell at a profit, and that’s when you want to sell anyway for other reasons. Given government borrowing costs I still kind of like this plan, even if it takes a while.
How much do you think it would cost per barrel to build long term storage facilities at scale? And what cost to do it privately?
More than that though sounds like ‘environmental’ groups are determined to never let anyone do anything, even when it’s good for them long term or in general, and in general we’ve lost ability to do anything physical at scale, and that’s the real issue on top of ‘the low hanging fruit is not actually that low hanging anymore.’
“If (1) is right, presumably all of this is saying that doing the trade until we’re no longer making a profit would still make us money and wouldn’t hurt or anything, but wouldn’t have that much impact on production because there’s very little available production that can be reasonably turned on?”
I think so? A real oil expert might disagree with me. I think the nuance, that I didn’t discuss above, is that there is a lot of oil sand production that can be scaled up/down slowly (say 6 month timescales) that could be used to “break the legs” of a US lead attempt to create an incentive for new tar/shale production. I.e. OPEC/Saudi’s (ARAMCO) can, over the course of a year, decide to produce a ton of new oil sand production and keep the tar/shale unprofitable, then scale back once the tar/shale people give up. This might be to the US benefit though, keep creating this incentive and rely on them undercutting us and setting the long term price between some natural floor of oil sand price levels and the min price at which tar/shale becomes profitable. I will think and respond to the rest later, kid/wife just got home.
“What are we missing here? Perhaps the good leg is simply ‘buy oil futures’?”
I’ve been investing in an oil/energy Vanguard fund for ~10 years now under the understanding that basically oil and related industry prices are artificially depressed. My only concern is investor activism means I think I need to shift overtime to direct investment in a broad portfolio of oil companies, but not via a fund subject to pressure to head towards green energy (which might be a worthy idea, I’m just not convinced it’s the move right now). This has so far been me piling in chunks of money and watching them do nothing. I still think it will work out gangbusters in the 15-30 years timescale.
I will consider just straight buying long expiration futures as I agree some of them seem unreasonably underpriced given current conditions and the shape of the market (i.e. all of the above).
Adding other reply to this comment for 1 thread:
“If (1) is right, presumably all of this is saying that doing the trade until we’re no longer making a profit would still make us money and wouldn’t hurt or anything, but wouldn’t have that much impact on production because there’s very little available production that can be reasonably turned on?”
I think so? A real oil expert might disagree with me. I think the nuance, that I didn’t discuss above, is that there is a lot of oil sand production that can be scaled up/down slowly (say 6 month timescales) that could be used to “break the legs” of a US lead attempt to create an incentive for new tar/shale production. I.e. OPEC/Saudi’s (ARAMCO) can, over the course of a year, decide to produce a ton of new oil sand production and keep the tar/shale unprofitable, then scale back once the tar/shale people give up.
This might be to the US benefit though, keep creating this incentive and rely on them undercutting us and setting the long term price between some natural floor of oil sand price levels and the min price at which tar/shale becomes profitable.
At the moment I think a reasonable move might be for the US to take a 2 pronged approach of finding some incentive for tar/shale development, and also maybe price support action in oil futures. The more I write this out the more I think it would move OPEC towards their pre-08 crash actions (i.e. undercutting tar/shale producers via semi-slow to change, but producible using already in place oil sand production).
“Fundamentally it sounds like you think the hurdles are (1) regulation and (2) the production will have a lot of lag and be distributed over many years and (3) promises aren’t credible.”
Agree.
“More than that though sounds like ‘environmental’ groups are determined to never let anyone do anything, even when it’s good for them long term or in general, and in general we’ve lost ability to do anything physical at scale, and that’s the real issue on top of ‘the low hanging fruit is not actually that low hanging anymore.”
Agree. Our ability to interact with the physical world seems to be strangely regressing in some ways. This is a problem we could have solved in the past via drilling matched with strong environmental protections (or without them, but I would prefer we had them). Will prevent a length rant by cutting this line of thought off here.
So before I turn to the storage question, I wanted to figure out what it costs to build an oil field. I’m going to look at this question 2 ways. What are my guesses based on a 2005 RAND report, and then looking at what the press/news is saying as there has been some talk of renewed shale action with high prices.
From this RAND report (https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG414.pdf):
Now, this was a 2005 report, before the temporary shale oil boom, so it’s fairly outdated. But, it’s very useful for some of the estimates. Note: shale extraction was an open question in 2005, but now it’s far more understood and hydraulic fracking exists and we can use it to do in situ shale retorting (i.e. get oil from shale without just digging a giant pit). I’m going to include a few block quotes and then talk about what I think it means if in 2022 we want to restart shale production.
Note: Utah has a bunch of Tar sands, and there are proven, but undeveloped oil sands and non-shale reserves in the USA/Canada, but the above questions of “can we convince ourselves to do this physically” apply to those.
“Using this approach, a first-of-a-kind commercial surface retorting complex (mine, retorting plant, upgrading plant, supporting utilities, and spent shale reclamation) is unlikely to be profitable unless real crude oil prices are at least $70 to $95 per barrel (2005 dollars).”
“Assuming electricity at $0.05 per kilowatt-hour, power costs for
heating amount to between $12 and $15 per barrel (crude oil equivalent). An operation producing 100,000 barrels per day requires approximately 1.2 gigawatts of dedicated electric generating capacity.” [This is energy that goes into turning rocks back into liquidish oil, retorting, all in ’05 dollars. This is pre-hydraluic fracking. With hydraluic fracking this is at least an order of magnitude less, but you need quite frankly insane amounts of water. It’s, depending on who you believe, between .5 and 5 barrels of water used per barrel of oil produced. The used water is not clean, and is usually pumped back into the ground either in the oil field or in an appropriate non-oilfield piece of stable geology]
“Given that industry is unlikely to reach the production growth phase until 12 to
16 years after the decision to pursue process scale-up and confirmation and that this
initial decision has not yet occurred, an oil shale production level of 1 million barrels
per day is probably more than 20 years in the future, and 3 million barrels per day is
probably more than 30 years in the future.”
“Production of 3 million barrels of oil per day from oil shale in the United States
would likely cause world oil prices to be lower than they would otherwise be” [Note: The US produces ~11 b/d of crude oil]
Ok, that’s all the context quotes. Here’s the money quote from the ’05 RAND study:
“Considering mine development, upgrading, and modest infrastructure expenditures, a 50,000 barrel per day first-of-a-kind surface retorting complex will incur capital expenditures of between $5 billion and $7 billion (2005 dollars) and possibly higher than that. We assume operating and maintenance costs for first-of-a-kind plants to be between $17 and $23 (2005 dollars) per barrel”
The good part of their estimate is we know we don’t need as much energy (at the time they were thinking to literally heat the ground under the wells to release the oil, but instead we just pressure the heck out of it with water and release the oil). The downside is they think building a 50k bpd facility is 5 billion ’05 dollars.
We know we built some of these in the decade after this, and then oil prices went down and companies moved away from them. We also know that with hydraulic fracking we can build out at scale better (I mean, still really hard, just better than what they had in hand in 2005). I think a lot of it seems like a wash and I would expect as an order of magnitude estimate to probably come out even in 2022 dollars at a rate of 500k bpds/50billion dollars (i.e. their 50k bpd/5billion, but just scaled up) so maybe 100billion to online 1m bpd. Just writing this out that seems reasonable to me, they also say operation/maint costs of 20 per barrel, so 1m bpd = 18 billion per year in revenue net basic operation/maint costs, meaning the plant has to run 5 years to break even assuming no price fluctuations, and temporarily ignoring the problem that shale oil depletes fast and once you build out a facility you’d have to constantly build newer and longer pipelines to it, so probably 10-15 years to break even assuming you build this in the middle of a shale field and can constantly pipe to it, and this is all very very rough.
Looking at news coverage I see (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-nears-100-barrel-us-drillers-get-busy-costly-shale-basins-2022-02-08/):
“Chevron plans to boost its Permian [East Texas/West New Mexico] shale output 10% and Exxon said it could deliver 25% more oil and gas from its Permian holdings. …In the Bakken [North Dakota], oil output is around 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd), below its 1.52 million bpd late 2019 peak. In the Eagle Ford shale of South Texas, oil is averaging 1.1 million bpd, off the peak 1.7 million bpd in early 2015. … U.S. producers have been adding three rigs per week, but they would need to add 11 rigs per week to hold production at current levels [recall that shale requires that you sprint to stay in place] … “Unless $100 plus oil changes the investment mindset toward growth, I’m not sure we will see 1.5 million barrels per day again” in the Bakken, he said.”
“Spending budgets among U.S. independent producers are up 13% over a year ago, according to analysts at Cowen” [Woohoo! 13 Whole %, I may faint]
That article didn’t have anything useful, but I wrote out the comments so keeping it as context.
https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/dakota-prairie-refinery-stark-north-dakota/
Dakota Prarire Refinery, as far as I know that least from scratch new refinery in the US (and the 1st in a long while, as it’s easier to expand an existing plant than fight regulators for a new plant) cost 500M and can process 20k bpd to produce 8k barrels of diesel per day (plus saleable by products). So that’s .5B to produce 8k barrels of diesel per day (processing 20k barrels of crude to diesel), gasoline is more refined, but let’s run with that cost. We want 1m bpd, we so that’s 125
Dakota Prarire Refinery’s (assuming some benefits of scale, but also making gasoline not diesel) so ~62B just to refine the 1m bpd of crude.
Various sources say a shale well is between 2m and 8m, using Exxon (https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/investor-relations/other-investor-presentations/2018-Upstream-Permian-Spotlight.pdf) [note pg 29 very informative in terms of supply chain reality] I see XOM has 6k producing Permian wells, just under 40 drilling rigs. That’s a low end of 12B and an upper end of 48B in well drilling costs (XOM of course probably at the low end)
So ~62B in refining, 12-48B in drilling costs, so 1st order estimate from news/press releases seems like 75B minimum to develop a 1m bpd shale oil field, and probably 10 years if we give people smokes and have them stand at a wall if they get in our way, vs longer if we do things normally. [Note that West Texas, i.e. Permian is damn close to the 1st home of the oil industry once it moved from wooden pipelines and hand e barrels in Pennsylvania]. If we want a completely new filed, new production to lower costs and not just be moving planned 2040 production to 2030, but to take some semi-proven area, prove and build it out, it’s going to cost more.
So that’s a scale of the #s to build out a new oil company and new field. If we just want to store it, that’s another question. Currently the Strategic Petroleum Reserve uses giant salt domes created near refining facilities. Wikipedia says these facilities cost 4B to make, and currently can store 714M barrels of oil and can withdraw 4M barrels per day. Wikipedia, tragically, does not provide good sources for the production cost. I’m assuming that was in 1970s dollars, meaning for every approx. 1B barrels of storage we want, we need to spend approx 20B 2020 dollars to get that storage capacity now.
It seems reasonable to conclude that 120B + ongoing expenditures could add/process 1 million barrels of oil per day, and store a good amount of that output to cover price fluctuations. I don’t think we’ll do this reasonable thing, but it doesn’t seem that out of the question as an idea.
2 final thoughts:
1: ANWR and surrounding areas exist. This is a largely untapped area holding between a few billion barrels of oil to 10-20 billions of barrels of oil, plus lots of natural gas. Along with writing off nuclear power, new pipelines to Canada, big chunks of the continental US, we’ve also got ANWR. This is where it’s important to note the difference between proven reserves (i.e. oil we know is technically and economically recoverable), prospective reserves (oil that we think might be there) and dirt (that might have oil, but it costs too much to get). If prices go up, proven reserves go up, because suddenly existing areas of fields that you had to drill to deep or produced crap oil are economically viable. “A reserve is considered proven if it is probable that at least 90% of the resource is recoverable by economically profitable means”.
A lot of areas have oil that, if prices stay high (or we build out storage and promise to buy and re-sell via a government price support program) becomes “proven” overnight, merely because the price level has changed.
2: It’s been a long week, so I’ll just toss this mini-rant in: The way forward should (should, not has to be, will be, or needs to be) use natural gas wherever we can, use gasoline/diesel where its special advantages/density/processing to energy on the go make sense (i.e. planes/trains/automobiles), use nuclear (thorium?) some way to help transition coal base load away, and slot solar/wind (not hydro, I like salmon) in where reasonable. We cannot get away from oil anytime soon. I am not saying you are (at all) saying we need to, just including this in case people stumble across it and think “why does this guy love oil”. I don’t. I used to have a bumper sticker that read “Don’t drill in our rivers, we won’t fish in your oilfields”. But, I like modern society a lot, and everything we do depends on oil/nat gas. Our fertilizer depends on it, our cars run on it, and we’re many many exponential scalings away from replacing it in our lives.
We need a way to live with oil for the next big chunk of years, and if we don’t want to royally shaft a lot of people, we need to keep oil (and gasoline) prices reasonable. I don’t drive to work. My wife drives 5 miles to work. High prices at the pump are fine for us. But think on (as a policy matter) what high pump prices to do people commuting 50 round trip miles per day to minimum wage jobs, because they work 1-3 jobs, their spouse works 1-3 jobs and they live in a LCOL house in the approx. center. This is brutal hit to their budget at a time when food is going up, housing has done crazy things and wage increases don’t cover it.
The oil crunch was coming before Putin’s war, and before Biden’s whatever. Low prices lead to investment curtailment in the US/CAN because why spend money just to get wrecked by OPEC’s cheap oil sands? We didn’t step in, and now people are paying the price 5 dollars per gallon at a time.
Great stuff, thank you. Lot to think about, definitely should have done some of this a while ago, but what’s done is done.
The one very obvious thing here is that if it’s $20/barrel to build storage capacity for a strategic reserve, it seems like we should definitely be expanding our storage capacity and buying long-dated futures to get the supply to fill it. But there’s clearly a lot of things we could/should be doing, and can’t because of not having our act together.
But could you do the reserve privately? As in, literally raise money, build storage and start buying the futures? Got to think about it more.
Arghhhhhhh. I wrote out a super long response last night, hit send and went to bed. Apparently I closed the browser to fast and it disappeared into the ether.
“If (1) is right, presumably all of this is saying that doing the trade until we’re no longer making a profit would still make us money and wouldn’t hurt or anything, but wouldn’t have that much impact on production because there’s very little available production that can be reasonably turned on?”
After more reading having slept on this on this I think my 1st response of “oil sand production that can be scaled up/down slowly (say 6 month timescales) that could be used to “break the legs” of a US lead attempt to create an incentive for new tar/shale production. I.e. OPEC/Saudi’s (ARAMCO) can, over the course of a year, decide to produce a ton of new oil sand production and keep the tar/shale unprofitable, then scale back once the tar/shale people give up. This might be to the US benefit though, keep creating this incentive and rely on them undercutting us and setting the long term price between some natural floor of oil sand price levels and the min price at which tar/shale becomes profitable.” is probably fairly reasonable.
I think we would have (discussed below) credibility issues and other issues however.
“I notice I am confused why we have this expectation that oil will be so affordable – these futures seem cheap to me under these conditions? Also a hedge against bad conditions, so good to buy on multiple fronts? What are we missing here? Perhaps the good leg is simply ‘buy oil futures’?”
I have been slowly and systematically throwing money into energy sector. Some concern that mutual funds/ETFs are vulnerable to activist capture and thus might need to directly invest into full stream production, but that comes with its own issues. So I don’t have an answer, but my own behavior is that I’m comfortably allocating (on a continuous investment basis) between 5% and 10% of investments into a sector that has been getting hammered on the theory that it’s just been on sale for a long time.
Oil futures, especially long expiration ones might be an interesting way to get at the price problem and profit.
“Fundamentally it sounds like you think the hurdles are (1) regulation and (2) the production will have a lot of lag and be distributed over many years and (3) promises aren’t credible.”
Agree.
“Back of the envelope, we are talking about Russia taking a few million barrels a day offline, …
How much do you think it would cost per barrel to build long term storage facilities at scale? And what cost to do it privately?”
The meat of the post that disappeared was 2 ways of estimating (one from back of the envelop/one from news sources) the cost of building out from scratch a new shale oil field and full refining capacity for 1M barrels per day, using these sources:
(https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG414.pdf) [This is a pre-fracking revolution paper, so it’s really interesting but has a lot of estimates that are somewhat off b/c it was before widespread use/knowledge/deployment of hydraulic fracking]
(https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/2020/04/07/exxon-cuts-10-billion-in-capital-spending-mostly-in-permian-basin/) [Just some context about Permian Basin spending]
(https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/dakota-prairie-refinery-stark-north-dakota/) [most recently built fully new refinery that I am aware of. ~500M to build to refine ~20k barrels of crude per day into 8k barrels of diesel per day. Gasoline for cars is more refined, but this is small facility so you lose efficiency on size, but gain some because making diesel + by products]
(https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/investor-relations/other-investor-presentations/2018-Upstream-Permian-Spotlight.pdf) [XOM presentation discussing Permian basin, v interesting, but mostly see page 29 for a diagram of the kind of field infrastructure that needs to be built out]
My 1st order very rough back of the envelope calculation said ~100B to gain 1M barrels per day in crude production, based on 365M barrels per year, assuming profit of 15 dollars per barrel when oil is “expensive” and that most massive capital investments take 20-30 years to pay off.
Going from the news I calculated that each shale well is said to cost 2-8M, XOM has ~6000 in Permian (and ~40 drilling rigs right now) so 12B – 48B in well costs, plus you need massive infrastructure (Permian is right next door to the 2nd home of the oil industry after it left Pennsylvania, so one of the cheaper places in that sense). Permian production has, at points, been ~1M bpds (before dis-investment, see pg 5 of XOM presentation for the monotonically declining function of shale oil without constant reinvestment),
To refine that you need ~125 Dakota Prairie size refineries, so 62Bish.
Lower end 75B, upper end 110B, but this doesn’t include cost to get the oil from the field to the refinery and then to market, so probably closer to the upper end. Also doesn’t include operation/maint costs.
Now that’s just context on “if we want to take make a new field”, like say ANWR or any of the other “proven reserves” or “prospective reserves”. Note the definition of proven reserves includes “economically and technological feasible” so as prices rise and it becomes viable to drill deeper (ok, not actually deeper, but to deploy more expensive extraction methods) existing proven reserves get large b/c you can extract more from them.
How long? The 2005 Rand paper says 10-30 years. We had the fracking revolution and saw that we could do this, in already built out (i.e. next to preexisting oil fields) areas, in 10 years, but to do it in not built out areas probably 15-20 years to come online fully.
To store it I turn to this 1990 CBO estimate (https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/101st-congress-1989-1990/reports/90-cbo-020.pdf) which says that it cost 3.4B 1988 dollars to build 750M barrels of storage (via creation of salt domes using water to hollow salt formations out). The report also says it will cost 750M in 1988 dollars to add 250M barrels of storage. So I’m spitballing storage at 500M dollars per 250M barrels of storage. Slightly under counting inflation, but maybe technology has gotten somewhat better (but of course legal/regulatory/other costs might have gone up more) so I think this is probably lowish bound.
So to store another 6 month supply of oil we’d need ~4B barrels of storage, so 8B dollars to build out 6 months of storage, assuming sufficient salt formations exists in convenient areas.
“More than that though sounds like ‘environmental’ groups are determined to never let anyone do anything, even when it’s good for them long term or in general, and in general we’ve lost ability to do anything physical at scale, and that’s the real issue on top of ‘the low hanging fruit is not actually that low hanging anymore.”
Strong agree. We really do seem to be forgetting (at a policy/twitter/government level) how to engage with physical reality and it makes discussions like this hard to happen, because much of the blue check mark brigade/chattering class is so disconnected from physical issues that things like “convincing US producers to make more oil is asking them to trust us that they will spend 100B over 10 years, and we won’t sue them right before they can start making money and stop it all, and they will earn a reasonable return on investment. I’m not going to defend profiteering, but (I mean, I’m not a billionaire) I’m guessing they don’t invest that kind of money on 10-30 year time scales to get the 20% returns that twitter seems to think would be unreasonably high.
Same with storage costs/resale/using storage + government consortium (ARAMCO model) to create a price ceiling. It’s going to be incredibly expensive, on a long time scale, and I don’t know if we have the will to do it. Especially as a lot of people would see government investment into oil production like that as a betrayal of green energy.
After Saturday morning coffee I try and stay off the web for the weekend, so will return on Monday.
Yeah, environmental groups is my quick answer. In New York State we banned the fracking of natural gas from the Marcellus shale. This makes zero sense to me. (Given that natural gas has 1/2 the CO2/ kwh of electricity compared to oil/ coal.) Politics trumps ‘efficient’ markets.
“Environmental groups” seem like the biggest opponents of saving the environment these days, seems like there has to be a way to break out of that…
“On the contrary, last time I suggested the government buy long-dated oil futures and sell oil from the strategic reserve to compensate. Does anyone have a reason why this wouldn’t (1) be profitable and (2) work to lower current prices and (3) work to increase production?”
I think the issue is 2 fold.
1st the layout of general oil production: Oil production is divided a bunch of ways, but one way is oil sand vs shale production. Oil sand production has relatively high up front costs, you have to drill a ton of wells and set up a distribution network and figure out the specific geology and what not. But, once you’ve done this it produces for years. This might take 5-8 years to get started and an oil sand field would peak after ~30 years and then keep on for an incredible long time. My family has mineral rights that have been producing between a few hundred to a few thousand dollars of year for 50+ years. That’s an oil sand field.
A shale field is another matter, it’s pretty cheap to drill, but basically produces instantly and requires constant expenditure, drilling and fracking to keep going. The setup is slightly faster, but the cost of production is much higher and it doesn’t have this long buildup and slow decline. So maybe you can start producing in 1-3 years (depending on available nearby infrastructure), but you’re constantly required to keep drilling new wells, adding distribution networks and signing new deals with landowners (not for mineral rights, but to have places to pump your used fracking liquids into the ground). Plus people hate living near it, micro-quakes, annoyance, tons of trucks, constant drilling. This isn’t the quaint pump in the back 40 going “tick” “tick” “tick” every few minutes. It’s mini-heavy industry spots, throughout the lifetime of the field.
Tar sands are sort of in between pure shale and an oil sand. It’s basically the cost and problems of shale, but longer production like oil sands (but huge refining costs).
This time frame assume pre-existing infrastructure exists. This is a problem, because if the 08 crash and flatlining of oil prices in the following time period (vs high prices before that) tar/shale production cratered and oil sand production was moderately curtailed. We are not setup to re-start pre-crash 08 tar/shale production. We have to ramp up, in situ refining , pipes, brains, new everything b/c it has been so unprofitable to go after for so long the companies have very little capacity to spin up here.
Oil sands have some variable production, but (this is where my understanding is stretched a bit) is that you can always drop production lower fairly easy, you can’t just increase production without risking damage to the field that would increase cost of future production. Slow and steady wins the race here.
Shale fields on the other hand, it’s just an expensive sprint between areas followed by some minimal oil sand production after you leave (depending on geology).
2nd the specific problems with the futures idea: The break even price of shale oil is controversial, but it’s somewhere between 60ish and 100ish per barrel (to quote someone I can’t recall “the difference between ore and dirt is the price to refine and get the minerals in the dirt to market”). A lot of this depends on where the oil is, how much refining is done in situ vs downstream and the regulatory cost of the area. Modern refineries are insanely expensive and huge, and building them in the middle of nowhere is frowned upon for environmental reasons, but also so is pipelines so a bit of an issue there. For example, a Exxon complex in Baytown, TX is ~ 5 square miles.
So if we offer futures contracts at (say) 50 a barrel, 75 a barrel and 100 a barrel we’ve got an issue. At 50, no one is even considering tar/shale production increases. They might produce some to meet those contracts as a backstop against cheap oil (ala coronavirus times), but probably not. At 75 a barrel some of the easier tar/shale production that was already in the pipeline might be brought on slightly earlier, but they would probably just ramp up their oil sand production and try and take the extra profit. As you note, specific regulations could be used to attempt to address that. At 100 a barrel (with a long enough timeframe) they would probably do some production, but it would take years to come online. This production would require building pipelines and/or refineries in places like N. Dakota, Canadian Shield, and other places painted as “pristine wildneress” when we’re talking about oil production (and, of course, derided as corn/soy/canola fields of mono-culture deplorables during campaign season).
But, you’d have to offer massive amounts of staggered futures contracts to make it economically viable to do, at the same time I worry the answer still might be to just push the oil sands harder, let current plans for tar/shale come online and otherwise only marginally increase actual production (i.e. slowly slow down the oil sands to keep them in reserve for times of low cost oil and only run the tar/shale when people are willing to guarantee you 100/barrel.
I think this answers 2/3, but I’ll specific discuss 1 (profit). Tar/Shale production is so expensive, to convince people to get at it you’d have to offer unprofitable futures, knowing that you’ll be paying 100/barrel and when that oil production comes online it will almost certainly be lower. You might not even be able to regulate 100/barrel to be profitable, i.e. say “this future can only be fulfilled by new production from a field not online before 2022” depending on where it is coming from and the environmental issues, you might have to offer 125/150/175 in 2022 dollars to get it to worthwhile. And even then I wonder if the companies would believe it.
I don’t want to sound too off the wall here, but Michigan is actively trying to shank a crucial pipeline. We said no the Keystone XL, people are certainly going to actively resist future similar pipelines. You can’t economically handle this by sea from central Canada, and I don’t think you can get the in situ refining capacity (and distribution network) set up in less than a decade even if you overcome all enviro issues.
End notes:
1: There are different oil qualities and tar/shale is usually pretty crap to very crap. You’d be paying premium prices for meh goods.
2: Meaningful production increases might take 10-20 years to come online, that’s an eternity on a political spectrum and I don’t know if futures are the way to do that. I hate the idea of national oil companies, but that might be the way to go for some of these fields that will take 10 years to build out the infrastructure on. Read Daniel Yergen’s The Prize/The Quest for more (disclosure I took 1 or 2 classes from him back-in-the-day).
3: Daniel Yergen/Tim Worstall/Tim Newman would be the 3 people to reach out for more on this issue.
It looks like Russia isn’t going for a major victory and just wants to focus on the Donbass, if (the reporting on) their recent press conference is to be believed: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-first-phase-ukraine-operation-mostly-complete-focus-now-donbass-2022-03-25/
> LONDON, March 25 (Reuters) – In a scaled-back formulation of its war goals, Russia said on Friday that the first phase of its military operation was mostly complete and it would focus on completely “liberating” Ukraine’s breakaway eastern Donbass region.
> The announcement appeared to indicate that Moscow may be switching to more limited objectives after running into fierce Ukrainian resistance in a month of war.
> The defence ministry said Russian-backed separatists now controlled 93% of Ukraine’s Luhansk region and 54% of the Donetsk region. They jointly make up the Donbass.
I couldn’t find the original source, unfortunately.
Wow, good news if it’s true. Thx.
You can’t have both ” a tax on oil and gas profits, and return that money to consumers as a rebate,” and have an expectation that oil and gas companies will be motivated by profit. If you can kill the ‘windfall profits tax’ idea dead, like Elizabeth Warren out of the Senate dead, then you can have profit-motivated oil companies again.
This is indeed a cost of the approach, but it seems like what those companies fear is price risk. They’d be happy to trade some of their windfall profits on $200 oil for assurance they will definitely have $100 oil.
> Something that blew my mind when I first saw the numbers was simply that Russian oil and gas is not that much oil and gas in the context of the global market. It’s a few percent.
Hm, googling around I get a number close to 10% (eg, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/company-insights/082316/worlds-top-10-oil-exporters.asp, or https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_oil_production). Are you considering one tenth to be “few present”, or are we looking at different numbers?
Different numbers, this does look bigger, I was taking numbers of ‘missing barrels’ that I suppose assume that a large percentage of Russia’s capacity will still get utilized.
On the “EU acts by consensus” thing: Nowadays there is actually qualified majority voting on many issues, although foreign policy and other “political” issues still require consensus.
There have actually been a number of instances where some most/eu member states agreed among themselves on something with dissenters being left out. This has happened both inside and outside formal eu structures, examples being the Schengen agreement on open borders and the Euro, the notable example for structure outside the eu being the euro group that handled much of the fiscal measures during the big financial crisis (yes the Euro is part of the EU but the Euro Group setting and its ESM treaty is not).
My impression is that the lack of a gas boycott isnt just down to Hungary, but that countries like Germany and Austria aren’t on board either. If there was a sufficient coalition of the willing it would happen even if a few small countries hold out.
To me, it looks useful to include ‘Russia controls a land corridor to Crimea and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Crimean_Canal ‘ as one of the victory conditions.
Another one – ‘Ukraine de jure recognizes Crimea as Russian / Donbas as independent’, since that makes lifting sanctions so much easier.
Yeah, the land bridge seems like the ‘they get the maximal version of Crimea/Donbas.’ Should think more about how to handle de jure if it’s not present – usually peace terms involve an agreement on where borders are, or else it’s not a peace agreement.
The Newsom rebate will have a psychological effect on a lot of people, inducing more gas consumption, thanks to an overlapping alliance of the left side of the bell curve and the anti-arithmetic lobby.
Speaking of arithmetic, if we have a limited supply of battery production, which we do, we can achieve a much greater reduction in gas consumption by using our battery supply to build hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles instead of full electric vehicles. A Prius has a 2kWh battery, a Prius Prime 9kWh, and a Tesla 3 base version 54kWh (yes, the Tesla is ~500 lbs heavier, but that is due to the huge battery). The gas consumption reductions in practice are around 30%, 80%, 100%. Hybrids provide the best return on the battery investment, then plug-in hybrids (1.7x worse), and a distant last is the full electrics, which are 8x worse than hybrids. Musk has tweeted a bit against interest lately, but he hasn’t gone so far as to mention this inconvenient fact. The Question is how quickly could we reorient battery installation? And could we convince players like Musk that this won’t destroy their competitive position?
On the Chinese perspective: Morally speaking the world is zero sum. Economically, scientifically, technologically, aesthetically it is not zero sum–although moral values do have some effects on economics and aesthetics. If China wishes to design a society based on Confucian or Leninist values, or any values contrary to the sacramental liberalism promoted with sophisticated aggression by the American Empire, it must retain de facto sovereignty. By default, this assumes that their moral-cultural system cannot compete internationally with America’s. They may become more competitive, however, if America continues Left until it reaches some form of Cultural Revolution. Barring this, only with full sovereignty, functional independence, is it possible for China (or Russia) to remain a distinct, vigorous civilization. On the other hand, if cut off from the West, China risks a gradual return to stagnation. I sense that China’s elites are confident they can reprise past episodes of Chinese national glory without further outside assistance. The Song seem to have reached their peak through internal development. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese had the foresight to lay down many of the key conditions for this approach, not least with their Great Firewall.
From the CNBC article on impending calorie shortages: “According to Hansotia, about “13% of the global calories came out of production” when Russian and Ukrainian borders shut down.”
This is not true. Food exports from Ukraine/Russia are not sufficient to feed >1 billion people. What he probably meant to say is that 13% of internationally traded calories are being removed from the trade system. That’s probably closer to 4% of total global calories. About a quarter of all wheat and 15% of maize are exported, for example.
Not sure why morality need be zero-sum, this seems more like a ‘moral systems try to expand’ principle, so if they want to retain their morality they will need to have the leverage to do that. But the way to do that doesn’t seem like it is to damage America. Quite the opposite, actually – China needs a strong world economy so it can deliver the goods and retain the mandate of heaven, and a weaker America makes that harder not easier. In fact, a stronger America gives the slack necessary to make sacrifices like the great firewall. Doesn’t mean Xi/China/party see it that way, but that’s how I would model it.
And if they think they can do pure internal development and deliver the goods… I think they are very mistaken. They need outside markets and they need various imports, or what they are doing won’t work, and Russia is not plausibly sufficient here although long term it helps. Especially since I would expect that Russia as a de facto Chinese vassal would become quite poor and have a hard time sustaining production.
4% of global calories does sound more reasonable. Still a potentially very big deal, but well within the range of what can be fixed if people anywhere did anything. Which they don’t seem to be doing? I’d also be curious to see what it takes to get people to substitute (e.g. wheat into maize) on a major level.
On the batteries, that’s interesting. If that is the limiting factor do we know what it is based upon and how much production can respond to increased demand/price? But yeah, if it’s the limiting factor and it’s a 6x difference then hybrids are the way to go for max impact. More than that would be to give them to those who drive the most – e.g. if you put the electrics into the hands of Uber/Lyft drivers and put them in hybrid trucks that are always on the move, you could likely get several times the impact?
I always thought of the Cold War moral-ideological struggle (and others in history) as being zero sum. I read you as saying that the Sino-American ideological struggle is not zero sum because, unlike the Soviet Empire, China is deeply enmeshed in global trade, including with America. I don’t think the economic difference softens the ideological competition in the long term, although it’s an old dream that economic interdependence will in itself ensure peace. China’s trade as a percentage of its GDP has dropped from 65% to 35% in the last 15 years. By comparison, in the same period global trade declined from 60% to 50% of global GDP. The CCP has been working in recent years to reduce the private sector’s dependence on foreign financing and taking many other measures that point in the same direction, including expending a great deal of money and talent to catch up their semiconductor sector. Other than tech transfer, the main benefit China derives from trading in the American system is a trade surplus that keeps unemployment low. The employment effect was also a benefit America accrued from its post-WWII trade surplus. But, there are other ways to reduce unemployment, which entail restructuring the economy. The question resolves to what marginal benefits the Chinese can obtain in the form of tech transfer, skills acquisition, competitive pressure, and various types of proprietary knowledge from continued participation. I’m more skeptical of their continued dependence on these types of imports than you are. They have a high IQ population that exceeds in numbers the combined populations of Europe, North America, and the developed East Asian nations. Also, the legitimacy of America’s ruling class was not hurt by the weakness of the global economy after the War.
I would also urge that China and other surplus nations have hurt American power by seriously undermining its manufacturing sector–thereby also hurting the global economy by reducing innovation. (https://itif.org/publications/2012/03/19/worse-great-depression-what-experts-are-missing-about-american-manufacturing) I think this detrimental effect on the American economy is one of the reasons the CCP has persisted with its current economic model, despite its increasing debt problems. The ledger for the present Sino-American relationship shows profits for the Chinese economy, but probably some insidious Chinese losses on the moral/cultural side of the ledger from factors like the millions of Chinese educated in the West in recent decades. The Americans ought to reform it for economic reasons, the Chinese for moral/cultural reasons. Given that both sides have strong incentives to diverge, I consider it a matter of time before it happens–probably in this decade.
On batteries, I agree that full electric might still be useful for a few applications, like taxis that run 24/7. There isn’t significant idle production capacity for car batteries, so they are at least one of the limiting factors. In the US last year 4% of light vehicles sold were full electric (3%) or plug-in electric (1%); another 4% were hybrids. If production of the first two categories were reduced by 90%, production of the hybrids could be increased to ~55% of all vehicles. Overall fuel savings versus a baseline of a pure ICE fleet then rise from 5% to 17%. From a purely environmental or fuel-saving point of view, we moved toward electrics too soon. I don’t want to oversell this idea. Like almost anything in the vast energy sector, the short term advantage is small, the turning radius of the system large. The yearly turnover of the passenger vehicle fleet is around 7%, giving a 0.84% marginal fuel advantage after one year of this effort to focus on hybrids. Battery production is ramping up quickly in China and Europe (40+% CAGR in the last 5 years) and is expected to achieve at least 25% CAGR here in the coming 5 years. Given their current higher battery production, Europe could actually maximize fuel efficiency by going to almost 100% plug-in hybrid this year.
On global wheat/food issues. I’ve been following Sarah Taber – a crop scientist on Twitter – and she seems to think that it’s mostly overblown. TLDR: Places like the middle east and the horn of Africa might be in trouble, not because there’s a global shortage but because they are poor and have very fragile food systems so they don’t have the time or money to ship from India (which has had a great harvests recently) or elsewhere.
Some threads:
I came here to post Sarah Taber’s threads as well. Here is another good one https://twitter.com/SarahTaber_bww/status/1507776806090584065 . Key points: “25% of wheat exports” is a very misleading statistic, because the vast bulk of wheat is consumed in the same country that it is grown in. Ukraine is roughly 1% of global wheat production. The time to plan for increased wheat production is in the fall, when the wheat is planted — which wheat farmers did, in response to a rise in wheat futures caused by the tensions in Ukraine at that time.
RE ‘does bilingual thing fine’ – um, well, no, not quite (sorry for countering the Narrative…).
Few excerpts from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_policy_in_Ukraine :
– In April 2019, the Ukrainian parliament voted a new law, the Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language. The law made the use of Ukrainian compulsory (totally or within certain quotas) in the work of some public authorities, in the electoral procedures and political campaigning, in pre-school, school and university education, in scientific, cultural and sporting activities, in book publishing and book distribution, in printed mass media, television and radio broadcasting, in economic and social life (commercial advertising, public events), in hospitals and nursing homes, and in the activities of political parties and other legal entities (e.g. NGO) registered in Ukraine. Some special exemptions are provided for the Crimean Tatar language, other languages of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, the English language and the other official languages of the European Union; as languages of minorities that are not EU official languages, Russian, Byelorussian and Yiddish are excluded from the exemptions.
– The de-Russification of Ukrainian toponymy implied also the removal from railways and airports of any information board written in Russian; as of December 2016, all information had to be given only in Ukrainian and English
– In May 2017, Verkhovna Rada enacted an analogous law prescribing a 75% Ukrainian-language quotas in all television channels operating in Ukraine
– TV and film distribution firms must ensure 90% of their content is in Ukrainian
– Ukraine’s 2017 education law made Ukrainian the required language of study in state schools from the fifth grade on, although it allows instruction in other languages as a separate subject.
Few interesting tidbits from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_of_Ukraine :
– Citizens are prohibited from joining a jury if:
they do not speak Ukrainian
…
– Since January 1, 2010 it is allowed to hold court proceedings in Russian on mutual consent of parties. Citizens, who are unable to speak Ukrainian or Russian are allowed to use their native language or the services of a translator.
—————-
So before 2010 it was not even possible, and after 2015 and 2019 laws (see first link) I suspect it became harder.
Compare with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_Canada:
– French and English are equal to each other as federal official languages;
– Debate in Parliament may take place in either official language;
– Federal laws shall be printed in both official languages, with equal authority;
– Anyone may deal with any court established by Parliament, in either official language;
– Everyone has the right to receive services from the federal government in his or her choice of official language;
– Members of a minority language group of one of the official languages if learned and still understood (i.e., French speakers in a majority English-speaking province, or vice versa) or received primary school education in that language has the right to have their children receive a public education in their language, where numbers warrant.
Isn’t the issue that Hungary can resell what it imports to the rest of the EU, circumventing the ban? Inter-EU trade cannot be restricted, can it?
Maybe there are logistic issues that makes this moot for oil and gas. It sounds lucrative for Hungary either way.
My presumption is that it is not so hard to track which oil/gas are Russian, or that they could simply cut off Hungary’s oil and gas sales since Hungary does not naturally have oil/gas exports – any export would be de facto assumed to be Russian. And what are they gonna do, complain about that?
> or that they could simply cut off Hungary’s oil and gas sales since Hungary does not naturally have oil/gas exports
This would be a *major* escalation in intra-EU relations, and really betrays a stunning lack of familiarity with the way the EU works (no offense intended, I don’t know how interstate trade in the US works either). The EU has a single market, which don’t let you impose tariffs on goods from member countries. Not to speak of outright banning certain goods from member countries. Remember that any steps have to be legal, and sometimes that stops e.g. Hungarians in general transacting in oil is certainly not.
Yes, exactly this. You can’t just “ban russian oil” unilaterally, or “stop buying russian oil” unilaterally. It is after all private actors and not the government doing the buying, and “stop buying X” effectively means “ban private actors from buying X”. The whole point of the EU single market is that different countries are restricted in what they can and cannot ban.
“regulations that are doing the opposite of what they are supposed to be doing right now”
I would expect you of all people to know better than assuming the regulations *aren’t* supposed to be doing that.
“The part I do not understand: Why everyone else can’t agree to do it anyway.”
Consider the possibility that everyone else does not actually want to do it just like the politicians don’t want to give their citizens energy shortages. “We’d love to do a ban but we can’t, hands are tied.”
“I continue to not understand the perspective taken by Kasparov here, and expressed by Zelenskyy, that Article 5 is a dead letter and failure to fully go to war for Ukraine (for whom Article 5 did not apply) means that we wouldn’t go to war for the Baltic countries.”
It would be very convenient to Zelensky if isolationism made Article 5 a dead letter, because it suggests a “demonstrate article 5 is still real” course of action that happens to be very helpful to Ukraine. This seems like a sufficient explanation to me, a mix of motivated reasoning and outright lying in pursuit of Ukrainian intervention.
Agreed on the first one that one good explanation is that the veto is an excuse to not do what they don’t want to do, but if people understood they could do it anyway they could invalidate the excuse, so seems worth pointing out the situation.
The most likely Article 5 demonstration is if Russia actually attacks Poland or the Baltics inside their territory, which carries a substantial risk of nuclear war. Given how things are going it seems crazy for Zelenskyy to want this to happen. Other than that, what would the demo be that helps Ukraine? I suppose they could increase garrisons in the Baltics/Poland but that does not much help.
What I meant was that if allowing Ukraine to be invaded shows Article 5 to be fake, and people want Article 5 to be real, it would follow that people ought not to let Ukraine be invaded. I think the first premise is obviously wrong because that’s not what Article 5 is, but I notice that I have not seen this reasoning from anyone who isn’t in favour of defending Ukraine, it seems like a shaky argument designed to reach that conclusion.
Zvi, could you please shed some more light on how grave the situation is from your point of view? I’m worried but doing OK, whereas my usually cheerful friends are basically preparing for the end of the world. Specifically:
a) What is your personal % estimate for a NATO member being attacked in the next 12 months…
b) …and for a nuclear weapon being used by Russia (anywhere) in the same time period?
c) Would you have any investment advice (long-term, risk-averse, mid-income) given the current and upcoming global situation?
d) To what extent do you consider the current problems (pandemic, war, social and economic tensions) as an argument in favor of Turchin’s secular cycles and the cliodynamics approach? Should I basically expect another 5-10 miserable years?
e) To what extent are you now worried about the entire Great Reset narrative and the CBDC? It seems that the situation with Canadian freezing of the funds/accounts during the truckers’ protest was a very alarming precedent for the liberal democracy, but this concern went largely dormant after the Russian invasion started.
a) 2%? If this is a ‘real’ attack rather than attacking inbound equipment or something.
b) Again something like 2%? Seems deeply useless but you never know.
c) Not investment advice! But still working on it. See the discussions on oil.
d) I don’t see any reason to think that’s real?
e) I mean things didn’t get better, if anything concern should be higher, and I said my peace on that in those posts.
Re: Kasparov perspective. If the reason for non-intervention now in an otherwise basically maximal situation is the threat of nuclear escalation, there’s no real difference in the escalation threat if we intervene in Ukraine without a defense pact or intervene in Poland/Baltics via Article 5, so why wouldn’t we let a minor NATO country go for the same reason? This does not seem crazy to me, and especially not if the political landscape in the West is different in a couple of years. You seem to have almost absolute faith that because letting NATO go is terrible, it won’t happen. Kasparov (and I, TBH) has more faith in people taking the easy short-term do-nothing route (or the compromised sell-out route) even when it has obvious bad long-term consequences.
“Collective security means ‘Ukraine wants people to promise to protect it’ and I still don’t know why Ukraine thinks this is worth asking about.”
I think that Ukraine wants Putin to tell Russia that he is going to respect Ukrainian sovereignty, so Russian propaganda will be less effective in Russia next time they invade.
Could you use the prediction market itself to solve the definitional issues?
Like, open a second question: “Who won the war?” and use the price of that after a while to decide the first question. Or just have the first question keep running for some time after the war ends and then use that price to decide which way it pays out.
Or maybe there’s some way to structure a market so that it never pays out for any question. Have the current value of all your bets determine how much weight you can put on new bets, then automatically adjust the weight those bets have when any other question changes.
On reparations and “total victory”. I agree there likely will not be (nor should be) the word “reparation” in the peace-document, if ever there will be one. No Russian would sign and: Reparations are bad, even for winners. Still: Say, Germany/EU put an “energy-import-tax” on Russian gas/petrol/coal – and finance investment in Ukraine with the proceeds. NS1 and NS2 are wonderful pipes. And UA really needs to concentrate on productivity not rent-seeking. – Winning back Crimea/east of Donbass would be a nightmare for Ukraine. Who to compensate / to arrest/ what to confiscate/ return?!? “Loosing” them was a big factor in giving a pro-west political movement a stable majority! Would Biden have won if NY and CA votes were not counted? ;) – One thing as a German: you say: “relying on Russian oil and gas for no reason?” – Err, we need that stuff, as all do. And lots. Russia sells it. Cheaper than the Saudis, Katari, Nigerians. Cuz pipelines: great, cheap once built, clean, reliable. Neither Norway nor UK can produce enough for all EU. So, we rely on it. – Update: UK could, if going shale – Matt Ridley says in his newest post, but he is bad, I am told. By wokees. https://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/putins-fake-fracking-news/
Oh, and update on Kamil Galeev: I’ve read now all his threads, can confirm even more: he knows his history/politics (and more than I do) – I do think he is over the top on his “small lost wars cause regime-change”: 1904/5 it was, but Putin’s regime in 2022 is different. I hope Kamil is right, though I would believe the regional elites to be more likely than the cops to form “the counter-elite”. (Love your comment on that pic with Olga Misik, though)
“On the contrary, last time I suggested the government buy long-dated oil futures and sell oil from the strategic reserve to compensate.”
I think the problem here, is that the strategic reserve does not, in theory, exist to lower gas prices just before an election. (Which is the only reason they’re considering tapping it.) It actually exists to cushion major supply disruptions while the US itself is at war, so that the US doesn’t lose the war because of them.
It’s not available to do that if it’s expended lowering gas prices right before an election.
The big issue here, as I see it, is that it isn’t obvious that obstructing energy production in the US has ceased to be a political priority of the Democratic party. As long as there’s a powerful faction in one party that is dedicated to that goal, long term investments in any power source they might attack are too dangerous to make: You might dump a few billion into a new oil field or pipeline, only to have it shut down after the money is spent, and before you’ve earned it back.
The US has become a low trust society as far as any investment the Green faction of the Democratic party is hostile to is concerned. And they’re hostile to basically every practical source of energy.
Until we can find some way to guarantee that long term investments in energy infrastructure will not randomly be rendered valueless, they won’t be made. And it doesn’t matter that they’re technically feasible, or would be economically smart if the investment were safe.
Re: prediction markets. I don’t really see the difference between your Minor Russian Victory and Minor Ukrainian Victory. (Except Russia gets some other nebulous pledge… which who knows if it’s kept and why is there any trust.) It also seems like there should be some ‘no victory’ condition. Putin can’t make any concessions and save face, and neither can Ukraine and the pointless struggle continues on with no end in sight.
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